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Summary findings
Alba, Claessens, and Djankov assess Thailand's policy  related lending limits, violation of which contributed
options  for reducing large corporations'  vulnerability to  poor  intermediation and the recent crisis.
economic shocks and improving their corporate  * Improving disclosure and accounting practices. Self-
governance - and for providing smaller firms a more  regulatory agencies may need to play more of a role,
stable funding structure.  possibly with more legal power to discipline violators.
Using data for firms listed on Thailand's  stock  *  Better enforcement of corporate governance rules.
exchange, they empirically assess the relative importance  The formal structure for corporate governance is
of various factors determining the cost of capital, the  standard but enforcement is weak.
availability of financing, and policies and distortions that  *  Facilitation of equity infusions. Investors -
affect corporate governance in nonfinancial firms. The  especially minority shareholders - may need to play a
empirical findings highlight weaknesses in corporate  more direct role in monitoring  and disciplining
governance and the inherent risks in Thailand's  managers. To attract new infusions of equity, new equity
corporate financing structures.  owners may need more-than-proportional  representation
They conclude that the most important task in  on the board of directors until other investor protection
improving the structure of corporate financing and the  mechanisms are strengthened.
framework for corporate governance is to change  * Improving the framework for corporate governance.
incentives. This will involve:  A broad public discussion of corporate governance,
- Accelerating legal reform, including reform of  similar to recent discussions in the United Kingdom and
bankruptcy and foreclosure laws.  elsewhere, may be needed to clarify the distribution of
* Improving bank monitoring of enterprise  control in the economy's real sector.
management and encouraging  banks to develop more  * Strengthening institutions responsible for gathering
arm's-length relationships with firms. This will require  and analyzing data on firms of all sizes and for
greater transparency and disclosure of ownership  monitoring firm performance and behavior.
relationships and stricter enforcement of insider and
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1.  INTRODUCTION
The corporate finance structure in Thailand has not served the country as well as it could.
Many corporates'  financial structure was very fragile in 1997, which contributed to the depth and
length of the financial crisis.  In general, firms found themselves very exposed to the changes in
economic environment  following the financial crisis. Long term funds from local sources for every
type of firm were scarce-due  to the lack of institutional investors and the excessive reliance on
bank financing. Both contributed to overextended offshore borrowing by Thai corporates.  Small
and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Thailand have had relatively little access to formal financing, as
lending was skewed to large firms, and the cost of any financing for these firms has been high, with
resulting constraints on SME growth.  In addition to a lack of creditworthiness, poor information
and high administrative costs, this  is due to the limited forms of collateral that  can be used or
pledged and the insufficient skills of borrowers.
The recent financial crisis and the slower economic growth in recent years relative to the
level of investment have shown that the allocation of savings in Thailand has not been efficient,
particularly for the larger non-financial firms.  It was also geared towards too risky activities.  Our
contention is that the financing and corporate governance structure of large corporates has led to
inefficient investment, with excessive diversification and declines in profitability over the past few
years.  Looking forward, large corporates need to reduce their financial vulnerability to econormic
shocks, and corporate governance needs to be improved to enhance the efficiency of investment.
SMEs need to have better access to financing  and a more stable funding structure.
This study assesses the various policy options to achieve these outcomes. To do so, the
study analyzes the financial structure of firms in Thailand, draws lessons from the intemational
experience, and suggests possible improvements. It reviews the framework for corporate financing
in Thailand, using interviews with financial and large non-financial firms and reviews of the legal
and  regulatory framework.  The  study assesses  empirically the  relative  importance  of various
factors determining the cost of capital, the availability of financing, and the different policies and
distortions affecting the corporate governance framework for non-financial firms.  Using data for
firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), the structure of financing, the efficiency of
investments, and the effectiveness of current corporate governance mechanisms are analyzed and
compared with that  in  other economies.  The empirical findings highlight the  weaknesses in
corporate governance and the risky corporate financing structures.
The outline of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 describes corporate performance and
corporate financing pattems  in  Thailand during the  1994-97 period.  The paper  then  reviews
international experience with different financial structures and corporate governance mechanisms
in section 3.  It proceeds with reviewing the institutional framework for financing and corporate
governance in Thailand in section 4.  In section 5, some specific hypotheses are tested for Thailand
2regarding the links between corporate governance, corporate financing and firm behavior.  Section
6 reviews medium-term  areas of possible policy action. 2
2.  CORPORATE PERFORMANCE  AND CORPORATE  FINANCING  PATTERNS IN
RECENT YEARS
The recent financial crisis in Thailand revealed some of the weaknesses of the corporate
sector. 3 While the magnitude and  severity of the crisis was  unexpected, there  were  signs of
deterioration in corporate performance before July 1997. This becomes clear once we consider the
evidence on the performance of Thai corporates in the years before the crisis.  Productivity growth
slowed down starting in 1995, and leverage, already high by international comparison, increased
significantly as early as 1995.
Using  data  for  all  firms  listed on  the  Thailand  Stock Exchange  for  which  financial
statements are available, we can show that the deterioration in corporate performance started in
1994 using four indicators of enterprise performance (Table 1).  First, we review the time series of
the profits over interest expense ratios in 1994-97.  In 1994, profits were 5.78 times higher than
interest expenses for the average SET firm.  By the end of 1995, this ratio fell to 4.01, by end-1996
to 3.11, and was then further reduced by half (to 1.49) in 1997.  In other words, by the end of the
period, two-thirds of all profits of Thai listed firns went to cover interest expenses.
Table  1: Deteriorating Corporate Performance
Period  Number  of Profits  over No of firms  Loans  of  Profits  over  Leverage
Firms  Interest  with  Profits  Firms with  Liabilities




1997:Q4  356  1.49  114  36.4  7.3  2.95
1997:Q3  356  2.59  83  30.8  10.2  2.95
1997:Q2  357  3.18  71  18.4  N/A.  2.12
1997:Q1  353  3.66  54  16.2  N/A.  2.01
1996:Q4  354  3.11  49  11.8  14.9  1.90
1995:Q4  354  4.01  34  7.6  18.1  1.67
1994:Q4  352  5.78  18  1.4  24.0  1.50
Notes: Profit is defined  as earnings  before  interest,  taxes, depreciation,  and amortization  (EBITDA)
Leverage  is debt over  equity.
Source: SET  database.
2 While the analysis is made in reference to Thailand's  recent financial crisis, the paper  does not discuss
the issues of short-run (or medium-term) exchange and interest  rate management that  might be  relevant
for corporate financing developments.  For this we refer to Dwor-Frecaut et al., 1998.
3  While  the  focus of  the  paper  is on  corporate governance in  non-financial  institutions,  much  of  the
discussion also applies to financial institutions.
3The number  of firms with interest  expenses  exceeding  profits increased  six-fold-from 18
to 114-during this same  period. The reduction  in profitability  meant  that for more  than a third of
all outstanding  loans (36.4%),  firms could  not cover  interest  expenses  in full,  up from only 1.4%  in
1994. The ratio of profits to liabilities  also went down  from 24.0% to 7.3%.  Finally, leverage
increased to  an average of 2.95-twice  as high as the 1994 value.  The situation became
particularly  worrisome  in the construction  sector,  which  has now  the highest  leverage  (5.25).
Not just the listed firms, but also smaller Thai firms have seen a decline in financial
profitability  in the last few years. According  to a survey  of 842 firms, average  firm profits have
declined  from 17% of capital in  1994 to 4% in 1996 (Dollar and Hallward-Driemeier,  1998).
There also has been a sharp rise in leverage,  especially  of short-term  foreign borrowings.  The
average  debt-to-equity  ratio in the survey  sample  is 200%, with almost  three-quarters  of liabilities
short-term. While  larger firms tend to have  higher  debt-equity  ratios, smaller  firms are thus also
quite  leveraged.
The financial  crisis has revealed  these weaknesses.  As is typical  during a financial  crisis,
many Thai firms are-  now complaining  about the high cost of funds and the limited access to
financing.  The survey  performed  in the last quarter of 1997 and the first quarter of 1998, sheds
some light on the nature of this credit crunch (Dollar and Hallward-Driemeier,  1998).  In the
responses,  access  to finance  was mentioned  more  often  in the first quarter of 1998  than six months
earlier  as a bottleneck  facing  firms. More larger firms  than smaller  firms reported  problems  with
access  to financing  according  to the survey,  but firms of all sizes mentioned  the cost of finance  as a
worry. Local firms  mention  cost as a worry  more  often  than foreign  firms in Thailand,  but there is
little difference  between  the two  types of firms regarding  their access  to capital. The difference
between  exporters  and non-exporters  is more  striking:  access  to capital is mentioned  as a problem
by non-exporters  three times  as often  than by exporters,  while  costs of financing  is mentioned  two
times  as often.
The survey  also finds that SMEs were generally  less likely  than larger firms to mention
access  to finance  as an obstacle to growth  from a longer  run perspective. This may be because
SMEs received  little external  financing  in the past and have been better able to adjust to tight
liquidity  conditions.  This does not obfuscate  the need  for better financing  of SMEs, of course,
because  they are likely  to be the growth-engine  in Thailand  as they have been  in other countries.
Hence,  both as a short-run  and as a longer  term development  goal, particularly  in an environment
where  firms are trying  to expand,  finance  is an issue  that needs  addressing.
One may wonder why some corrective  measures  were not taken prior to the financial
crisis. While  we discuss  this issue at length  in the coming  sections,  we would  like  to highlight  two
reasons.  First, businessmen  and financiers alike were likely blinded by the success of Thai
corporates  over the last decades  that produced  impressive  economic  growth  rates.  In spite of the
recognition  of some of the underlying  fundamental  weaknesses,  most investors  did not view the
crisis as inevitable. Second,  the significant  concentration  of ownership  in the hands of family
groups  and the lack of counter-balancing  forces-professional management,  for example-reduced
the corporates' ability  to change  their behavior  and more  generally  their willingness  to improve  on
some  of the recognized  weaknesses.
Looking forward, it is important  to identify the fundamental  weaknesses  of the Thai
corporate sector that triggered this deterioration  in performance.  We discuss the weaknesses  in
corporate  governance  and corporate  financing  in section  4, while  in section  5, we try to quantify
the impact. First, however,  we review  the international  experience  with corporate  governance  and
corporate  financing.
43.  THE INTERNATIONAL  EXPERIENCE  ON CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE  AND
CORPORATE FINANCING
The debate of the "model"
The financing and governance of firms depends importantly on the institutional structure of
the financial sector.  International discussions regarding the  "optimal" financial structure  have
often contrasted two models: bank-centered versus market-centered (see Prowse, 1994 and 1998).
The former is typically associated with Japan and Germany (main-bank systems); the latter with
the US and  the UK.  The differences between the two models center on the  main  agent who
monitors the activities of the firm and takes the lead in disciplining management. 4 Under the bank-
centered model, banks play the  lead role in the monitoring of firms.  Under the market-based
system, a broader range of investors plays this role through the pricing, trading and buying of the
firm's  securities.  In both models, the monitoring activities of financial institutions or financial
markets  are  complemented by  those of many  other agents: other  firms  (through  competition,
suppliers and buyers' contracts), labor, the government, etc. (see further Shleifer and Vishny, 1997
for a review).
Bank-centered systems may have advantages in resolving informational asymmetries, and
thus lead to less liquidity constraints in firms, particularly at times of distress  (see, for example,
Aoki and Patrick,  1994).  There is some empirical evidence supporting the view that main-bank
monitoring mitigates information problems in financial markets. 5 Since information asymmetries
are more likely prevalent at lower-income  levels, bank-based systems may have advantages at early
stages of development. Thailand can be characterized as a bank-centered financial system, given
its high ratio of bank credit to the stock market capitalization.  A priori, the bank-based system
may thus remain appropriate for Thailand.
There  is  no  easy  empirical answer to  the  question what type  of  financial  system  is
associated with consistently higher economic growth.'  Even for stable developed countries with
well-defined financial systems, it has been difficult to "rank" the different governance systems that
are in use now or have been in use in (recent) history in terms of their impact on the economy (see,
among others, Allen and Gale 1995, Walter  1993, and Saunders and Walter  1994). The debate on
whether there  is a unique financial structure optimally suited to monitor and govern firms in a
given country is therefore perhaps not very useful.  There might simply not be any ideal system
applicable to a specific country, since in practice the functions and effects of any financial system
depend on a  host of country-specific circumstances, including legal, social, cultural,  and  other
factors.
4 Three types of monitoring and related  disciplining actions can be distinguished  (see Aoki,  in Aoki  and Patrick,
1994): ex-ante,  when  investment  decisions  by the  borrower are being  reviewed;  interim,  during  the  life  of  the
investment  or in the day-to-day operations  of the borrower; and ex-post,  during periods  of  financial  distress  and
possible bankruptcy.
5 Hoshy, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990) compare the strength of the relationship between investment and measures
of internal  finance,  such as cash flow,  for Japanese firms who have strong relationship  with banks  against  firns
without such ties. They find that cash flow is a more important determinant of investment for independent firms than
for those firms who are members of a keiretsu  group with a main bank. Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein  (1995) find
that keiretsu firms which weakened their ties to banks by raising money directly from capital markets  became more
liquidity constrained than before.
6 In part this is because it is hard to characterize a financial system or a reform model adequately.  Many countries
combine elements of both bank- and market-based systems.
5However, there is recent evidence  that bank-centered systems may be more likely to lead to
non-market based  lending.  Basically, as corporates mature, their needs for outside finance for
investment purposes decline as they can rely more on internally generated finance (Jensen, 1986).
As "free" cash flow builds up in corporates, banks lose their disciplining influence over firms and
firms are more likely to  engage in inefficient investment and excessive diversification. The once
favorable reviews of the Japanese and German bank-based system are being revised in light of
recent  experiences given excessive diversification of  some German  firms and  the poor  recent
performance of corporates (and banks) in Japan.  Bank-centered countries like Germany have
begun to make the switch to a more open, market-based system, but this has not been without pain
and  has  been  a  process  underway  for  a  decade.  Japan  is  still  in  the  early  stages  of  its
transformation process and has had several years of low growth and a weakening banking system. 7
The issue of an optimal financial system may thus rather be better put as: is the system able to
adapt to new circumstances in the real and financial sector?
In summary, there may not be a preferred financial structure and mix between banks and
capital markets for Thailand to aim at.  Across the globe, there is growing evidence that banks and
capital markets do not substitute but rather complement one another (Demirgu9c-Kunt  and Levine,
1996).  In the short-run, Thailand's circumstances may well continue to favor banks over capital
markets.  Banks  are  relatively well  developed, are  closer to  enterprises,  as  they  have  more
information than capital markets do, and can perform a useful function in the necessary enterprise
restructuring in Thailand.  Capital markets, on the other hand, depend on corporate law, civil code,
and institutions such as courts that are generally perceived as weak in Thailand. Some time will
thus be needed before capital markets can play a stronger role in corporate governance. But, as
noted, there  is the risk of slower adaptation, and in the currently globally financially integrated
world, the time to adjust has become more compressed.  It is therefore all the more important to
move quickly towards  a flexible system that includes both well functioning capital markets and
banks.  Such  market-based financial systems tend  to  have greater  flexibility in  adapting  and
provide greater risk sharing.  Internationally, market-based financial systems with a greater role of
capital markets in the governance and financing of firms have been the general aim.
Financing structures
The starting  point for  discussing financial structures  should be how  a  financial sector
develops for a typical  country.  Low-income countries are characterized by reliance on informal
finance:  lending for  small investments is secured through a network of social relationships and
peer-group  monitoring, which  often  is  linked to  trading  and  agriculture  and  mainly  involves
advances for trade from one firm to another.  Foreign banks may play a large role in financing
foreign trade, but much less so in domestic  trade.  As the economy develops and urbanizes, some of
these  networks  formalize themselves  into neighborhood lending  associations or  banks.  This
process of more formal financial intermediation is often accelerated when there  are major  new
developments in the  economy, for  example, opening up  of new trading  opportunities or  new
industrial enterprises, which generate concentrated wealth. During most of this process, financial
intermediation is dominated by banks.  Capital markets only come to play a role in the later stages
of  development, when legal systems  and reputational  capital are  established  and people have
enough confidence to trade pieces of papers which just represent promises to pay.
7 Fukao, 1998,  draws attention  to the relationship  between  poor corporate  governance  of banks and corporates, and
the current  weakness  of Japan's banking  system.
6This pattem of financial development  at the macro country-level mirrors in many ways the
financial life cycle of a typical firm.  For example, a firm may start as a family-owned business,
using the family's own resources as well as savings collected through a network of social contacts.
It will then typically grow from its retained earnings and funding from its suppliers.  Risk-capital
will thus  mainly come from outside the formal financial system.  At  some point, when  it has
established a  sufficient business record, it may  be able to  get a  loan-often  only on  a  highly
secured basis-from  a local bank.  As it grows and expands its relationships, it will typically be
able to attract funds from a wider circle of financial intermediaries, including other banks, venture
capital and leasing companies.  Over time, it may be able to go to the capital markets, first to the
private placement markets; and later to organized, publicly traded bond and equity markets.  This
process  can be hastened by  improving the accuracy and reliability of information, reducing the
costs of contract enforcement, and encouraging greater transparency.  Also, reducing uncertainty at
the macro level, such as by encouraging govemments to maintain credible and consistent policies,
and at the micro level, by encouraging more stable industry regulation, will bolster the evolution of
firms along this 'life cycle'.
Building in part on these insights, part of the literature investigates (both analytically and
empirically) the  "optimal"  liability structure  for  firms.  Rather  than  try  to  summarize  this
literature, which mainly focuses on  developed countries, we refer to  the review by  Harris  and
Raviv,  1991. We wish to highlight two aspects stressed by recent literature: the liability structure
of a particular firm is endogenous  to its characteristics; and the importance of the liability structure
in disciplining management.  The optimal debt to equity ratio, for example, is not just  a function of
the risk characteristics of a particular firm, but also of the difficulty outsiders have in controlling
the behavior of managers.  Debt, for example, can be a  disciplining device for  firms with few
investment opportunities, but with good profitability (e.g., firms with so-called free cash flow).  In
other words, corporate financing structures perform important corporate governance functions. The
empirical  literature  on  developed countries has  indeed found  evidence of  many  relationships
between the liability structure and the behavior of managers.
Empirical work for developing  countries on liability structures on non-financial institutions
is sparse.  Important contributions are Demirgu-Kunt  and Maksimovic, 1994, Glen and Pinto,
1994,  Singh and  Hamid,  1992,  and  Singh,  1995.  These  authors  have  found that  firms  in
developing countries make more use of external financing than firms in developed countries (this
somewhat surprising finding may reflect the fact that the firms investigated in developing countries
are typically both larger and  "younger" than  firms in developed countries, and may  thus have
relatively easier access to  and rely more on outside financing).
More detailed analysis suggests, however, that firm financing in developing countries is
not that different from that in developed countries once one corrects for a number of factors. These
include the sector in which the firm operates, its riskiness, years of existence, etc. Importantly, one
needs to control for the institutional development (for example, quality of the legal framework and
the enforcement of laws and  regulations), the level of financial development and  other macro
factors in each country which matter importantly for financing pattems.
It has also been found that when more extemal financing, including from stock markets, is
available,  firms grow  faster  (Demirgiiu-Kunt and  Maksimovic,  1994).  Firms  in  developing
countries  use  generally  much  less  long-term  financing than  comparable  firms  in  developed
countries (Caprio and Demirgui,-Kunt, 1997).  At the same time, increased long-term finance and
7financing  from active  stock markets  is associated  with higher  productivity  in both developing  and
developed  countries.
These  findings  suggest  some  government  intervention  to stimulate  long-term  debt  financing
and financing  from equity markets. It has been found, for example,  that subsidies  and directed
credit do not benefit smaller firms, even in developed  countries,  and while  they can lengthen  the
maturity  of loans,  they do not necessarily  lead to more  efficient  investment,  or higher  productivity
growth. Indeed  in most cases, subsidies  are associated  with lower  productivity  growth  (Demirguei-
Kunt and Maksimovic,  1996).
Diversification
The high degree of diversification  of Thai firms raises specific questions  regarding  the
benefits  and costs of diversification. The effect of diversification  on enterprise  performance  has
been  a long studied  subject  for developed  countries. An increasingly  skeptical  view has developed
about the efficiency  of diversified  conglomerates.  There is much evidence  that diversified  groups
in developed  countries  tend to trade at a discount  relative  to a portfolio  of independent  firms in
related  industries;  have  on average lower  market  to book values  (Tobin's Q). Moreover,  they tend
to be broken up, and their share price significantly  increases  when  that occurs (for a review,  see
Rajan and Zingales,  1997).8  The  leading  explanations  for such  underperformance  have focused  on
the agency conflict between investors and empire-building  managers (Jensen, 1986).  More
recently, some authors have argued  that poor internal  management,  including  power conflicts,
forces inefficient  redistribution  of resources  to less  performing  divisions  (Lang  and Stulz, 1994).
In contrast, industrial-financial  groups persist and often prosper in many developing
countries  (see, for example,  Khana,  Tarun and Palepu, 1996),  where  private sector  activity  is often
dominated  by diversified  business  groups.  Theoretical  rationales  for such corporate structures
have  pointed  to the incentive  to resolve  scarcity  in the capital and  the intermediate  product  markets
in emerging  markets.  The emergence  of such groups may also be a  function of the weak
institutional  environment  in these economies. In countries  with weak law enforcement,  unstable
regulatory system  and widespread  corruption,  groups may have extensive  governance  functions.
They  may support internal  trade, ensure close  monitoring  of management  decisions  and manage  a
privileged  access  to political  favors, such as subsidized  credit,  favorable  regulation  and licensing,
and access  to strategic  resources. In conclusion,  groups may emerge  to capture scarcity rents or
compensate  for lack  of markets,  or both.
A recent paper (Fan and Lang, 1998)  distinguishes  between  two types of diversification:
related diversification  - for example,  joint procurement  of inputs, the sharing of marketing  and
distribution services, or integrating  vertically;  and unrelated diversification  - when the newly
acquired or developed  business  is run separately  and does not complement  the already existing
segments  of the corporation. For a sample of US corporates,  they find that diversification  into
8  Studies include the following:  Scharfstein  (1997) studies investment  patterns across divisions in conglomerate
firms, and conclude  that they appear to practice  some form of suboptimal  "socialist"  reallocation  of resources  across
divisions,  moving  funds from  profitable  firms in high Q industries  to support  investment  in lower Q sectors. Rajan,
Servaes,  and Zingales (1997)  find that diversified  firms  misallocate  investment  funds; the extent of mis-allocation  is
positively related to the diversity  of investment  opportunities  across divisions; and the discount at which these
diversified  firms trade is positively  related to the extent of the investment  mis-allocation  and the diversity  of the
investment  opportunities  across divisions.  Lang and Stulz (1994), and Doukas  and Lang (1998) find that corporate
diversification  through  mergers  and acquisitions  and direct investments  reduces  performance  for  US firms.
8related industries is associated with increased corporate value.  The authors hypothesize, however,
that  in times  of  financial crises  unrelated  diversification may  be  more  value-enhancing since
different segmnents  are affected differently by the financial crunch and the collapse of demand.
It  is  clear, nevertheless, because  of the many cross-ownership and  other  relationships
among members (including banks) of a conglomerate in developing countries, that the normally
assumed disciplinary role of corporate debt is likely to be much weaker. The effect  might even be
perverse for family-controlled  firms, i.e., more debt may lead to more risk-taking.  Moreover, any
positive view on the benefits of conglomerates in emerging markets has to be balanced with the
potential cost in terms of slower adaptation  of a  financial system to new circumstances when
insiders dominate.
Investor Protection
An important factor influencing external financing patterns is the degree of protection from
abuse by corporate insiders, provided by legal and regulatory mechanisms to outside providers of
funds.  Securities have rights attached that protect investors: equity shares give investors the right
to dismiss management if performance is not satisfactory, while debt gives creditors the right to
repossess collateral or more generally drive a company into bankruptcy if debt obligations are not
met.  The legal and  regulatory frameworks will determine to  what  extent these rights can  be
exercised and investors protected from potential abuse.
There is growing international evidence that the quality and efficacy of these protection
mechanisms influence whether and at what cost outside investors are willing to fund corporations,
and hence, the development of capital markets.  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1998) find that there  is a  strong negative correlation between ownership concentration and the
quality of investor protection mechanisms.  Ownership concentration substitutes for poor investor
protection by reducing the agency problem in corporations, but also has costs that are discussed
further below.  In another paper, La Porta et al. (1997) suggest that poor protection mechanisms
will limit the  availability of external finance for  firms,  as well as  raise the  cost  of  funds to
compensate for increased risk of expropriation. Based on a sample of 49 developing and industrial
countries, they show that countries with poor investor protection tend to have smaller and narrower
debt and equity markets, which is consistent with this hypothesis.
The quality of protection mechanisms depends on a wide variety of factors such as the
treatment of investor rights in company, bankruptcy and securities legislation, the efficacy of legal
enforcement, and the content and enforcement of capital market regulations, including listing rules
and disclosure.  On the equity side, these protection mechanisms include provisions regarding the
duties  of insiders (directors and  corporate officers),  the  rights and  remedies of  shareholders,
disclosure and use of information by insiders, and takeovers and new issues (La Porta et al.,  1998;
Asian Development Bank and World Bank,  1998).9  For creditors, the most basic  are rights to
9  These mechanisms  are directed at achieving  the following  objectives:  (1) directly  prevent abusive behavior by
insiders  (e.g., prohibition  of loans to directors,  rules regarding  insider trading);  (2) limit the discretion  of insiders in
key  corporate matters (e.g., mandatory shareholder approval of  fundamental  decisions); (3) ensure adequate
disclosure  and transmission  of information  (e.g., mandatory  disclosure  of connected  interests  of board  members); (4)
facilitate  shareholder  control  and monitoring  (e.g., permitting  proxy voting,  including  by mail); and (5) options for
"oppressed" minority shareholders,  such as judicial remedies to a  broad class of persons regarding corporate
decisions  that are unfairly  prejudicial,  or that unfairly  disregard  the interests of shareholders,  and the entitlement  for
dissenting  shareholders  to be bought  out of the company  at a fair appraised  value.
9repossess collateral  and to participate  in key decisions  such as filing for creditor protection  and
management  during reorganization  (Baird, 1993). Strong  disclosure  and accounting  standards  and
practices  are essential  for both equity  and debt investors  to monitor  corporate  performance.  Legal
and regulatory enforcement  is also essential, of course, for these rules to have real content.
International  experience  suggests, however, that countries do not  compensate  weak investor
protection  legislation  by improving  the quality of legal enforcement. Indeed,  countries  with weak
investor  protection  rules also tend to be those with weak enforcement  (La Porta et al., 1998),  other
factors remaining equal.' 0 Overall, the most important determinant  of the quality of legal
enforcement  is the amount of resources allocated  to the judiciary, including  for creating legal
infrastructure  such  as land  and securities'  registries  (e.g.,  Posner, 1998).
Concentrated Ownership
The fundamental  benefit of concentrated  ownership  is that it solves  the agency problem
since large shareholders  are able to more easily assert control  over a firm and limit management
inefficiency and  abuse.  Indeed, except for  certain industrial countries, high  ownership
concentration,  including  controlling  ownership,  is common. For example,  the share of the three
largest  shareholders  in the 10 largest  publicly  traded  private companies  averaged  46% in a sarnple
of 45 developed  and developing  countries (La Porta et al., 1998).  Table 2 shows ownership
concentration  in several  Asian and Latin American  countries. Shleifer  and Vishny  (1997) discuss
several  examples  of the benefits  for corporate  governance  of concentrated  ownership  in industrial
countries. In particular, large shareholders  have been associated  with high turnover  of directors
and managers,  and with the increased  likelihood  of takeovers,  which in turn has enhanced  firms'
efficiency  of operations  and investment.
Regarding  the pursuit of non-profit  maximizing  objectives,  Morck, Shleifer  and Vishny
(1988)  and other  authors find evidence  of an inverted  "U" shape relationship  between  the degree  of
ownership  concentration  and profitability. Intuitively,  as ownership  concentration  rises, agency
costs decrease  and hence  profitability  rises in the upward  sloping  part of the curve;  but as owners
gain control and wealth, they pursue empire building strategies and other private benefits of
control.  Controlling  ownership  may also lead to  increased risk taking behavior since other
stakeholders  such as creditors and employees  share in the downside  risks but not to the same
degree  in the benefits. The potential  for this type of behavior is greater if there are ownership
and/or family inter-relationships  between  banks and corporations,  bank incentives  are skewed
towards  risk taking,  and bank supervision  is inadequate.
Several studies in the empirical literature on corporate governance  make the point of
possible negative  effects  of the dominance  of family  control. Johnson  et al. (1985), for example,
study the effect on share prices of sudden  deaths of executives-in plane crashes or from heart
attacks-and  associated transfer of control to  other managers.  They find increasing prices
following  the death announcement,  particularly for large conglomerates  whose founders built
diversified  businesses.  The authors interpret  the evidence  to suggest  that changes  in management
can be useful as they can serve  to induce  more  efficient  management.  The evidence  also shows  that
family  control  can lead  to loss  of value.
ID East Asia, including  Thailand, appears  to be an outlier  in this respect  as is further analyzed  below.
10Table  2: Ownership  Concentration  in the Ten  Largest  Firms  (1)
All Firms (2)  Private (3)  All Firms (2)  Private (3)
Asia  Latin America
India  38%  40%  Argentina  50%  53%
idonesia  53%  58%  Brazil  31%  57%
Korea  23%  20%  Chile  41%  45%
Malaysia  46%  20%  Colombia  63%  63%
Pakistan  26%  54%  Mexico  64%  64%
Philippines  56%  37%  Venezuela  N/A.  51%
SriLanka  60%  60%
Thailand  44%  47%
(1)  The average percentage of common  shares owned by the three largest shareholders  in the ten
largest  non-financial  firms.  The percentages  are not corrected  for shareholder  affiliation  and cross-
shareholding  between  firms.
(2)  Excluding  the public share.
(3)  Largest  10 firms  with no public ownership.
Source: La  Porta et al. (1998).
Both  the benefits and  costs  of ownership concentration are  exacerbated  in developing
countries. Stylized facts regarding the legal and institutional frameworks in developing countries--
for example, weaker disclosure and property rights and underdeveloped legal enforcement--suggest
that the potential for abuse by managers is higher than in industrial countries.  Indeed, as noted
above, high agency costs are an important explanatory factor of concentrated ownership.  At the
same time, however, these  same institutional weaknesses also  facilitate the  abuse  of minority
shareholders.  Similarly, financial systems are more likely to be weak and inadequately supervised,
and  relationships between corporates  and  banks  more common." 1 Concentrated ownership  is,
hence,  likely to  lead to  increased  risk  taking  behavior  in  developing countries.  Finally,  in
developing countries, high ownership concentration also reflects the fact that most businesses are
relatively young, and still managed by their founders or their direct descendants.  While family
management may  be appropriate  during the  earlier  stages  of development, more  professional
management may be better suited as the economy and firms mature.  Presumably, this process of
professionalization should be faster in the larger and more complex businesses.
In sum, high ownership concentration is typically both a  symptom and a cause of weak
corporate governance.  Ownership concentration is symptomatic of weak corporate governance
because it is a means for investors to monitor and control management when protection systems are
weak.  It is a cause because it may lead to more risk-taking behavior and to the abuse of minority
investors.  In  addition,  controlling shareholders are  a  potential  source  of pressure  to  delay
improvements in disclosure and governance, as these improvements may  erode their  corporate
control and insider benefits.
11  For example,  it is more  likely  that governments  in developing  countries  offer  guarantees  to financial  institutions
and that  banks are undercapitalized.
11In  the  next  section,  we  discuss  some  issues  related  to  the  specificity  of  corporate
governance in Thailand.
4.  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  IN THAILAND
While  Thailand made  rapid  and  substantial  progress  in  developing its  capital--and
especially equity--markets during the  1990s, both corporate governance and disclosure systems
were still weak and capital markets played a  limited role in the governance of firms.  Perverse
connections  between  lenders  and  borrowers  were  not  uncommon  and  facilitated  excessive
expansion and diversification of firms, financing of prestige projects and other  "white elephants."
There have been five interrelated problems: concentrated ownership; high level of diversification;
weak incentives; poor protection of minority shareholders; and weak information standards. But
most of these problems were not more severe in Thailand than in the rest of East Asia and indeed in
many developing countries.
Concentrated Ownership
The organizational chart in Figure I can describe the salient features of large corporates in
Thailand.  Compared to the typical organization in developed countries, corporates  in Thailand
have two distinct  features.  First,  the  most  influential organizational form in  Thailand is  the
diversified conglomerate that  is controlled by  large corporations and, most importantly, family.
Second, those conglomerates have large debt, much of which is from local financial institutions.
Before the  1997 crisis, these large conglomerates used debt financing to expand aggressively-
through mergers and acquisitions, direct investment and project finance-while  undertaking little
hedging against foreign exchange and interest rate changes.
One of the most important features of the corporate sector in Thailand is the dominance of
family control over business operations.  Thai firms are generally closely held and managed by
majority - often family - interests.  As shown in Table  2, the three  largest shareholders own
between 44%-46% of the shares of the ten largest non-financial private firms.  These numbers do
not take into account shareholder affiliation and cross-shareholding between firms, and the former
is believed to be particularly important in Thailand.  Many shares are held in nominee accounts,
which make it difficult to  determine shareholder affiliation.  However, based  on Siam Business
Information (1995), a relatively limited number of families controls many of the corporates listed
on the SET.
12Figure  1: The Organizational  Chart  of a Typical  Thai  Conglomerate
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This characten'stic largely comes from the relative youth of Thailand's  corporates.  The
largest Thai-owned non-bank companies date back only to the 1940s and  1950s and many of their
founders are still alive.  These founders still play a very active role in day-to-day business.  Their
children usually hold senior management positions in the company.  Such companies rarely recruit
exterWally  for senior management positions.  This patten  of goverance  limits the aspirations of
middle management that do not belong to the founding fa  tily.  The significance of family ties is
re-enforced by the  practice  of inviting other families to  share ownership when setting up  new
ventures.  These help cement existing business relationships, but in the process may encourage the
creation of entry barriers and extend the importance of fanmily  groups in the corporate sector.
While,  as discussed in section 3, concentration of ownership is common in developing
countries, and there are both pros and cons to such concentration, on balance it may be excessive
in Thailand.  First, ownership concentration may impede the development of professional managers
that are required as economies and firms mature and become more complex.  Second, it may have
led to increased risk taking behavior by firms, in particular given the inter-relationships between
financial institutions and banks, and the supervisory weaknesses and perverse incentives prevalent
in  the  Thai  financial  system during  the  1990s.  In addition, in  order not  lose  control,  large
shareholders  may  have  diluted  market  pressures  for  improved disclosure  and  protection  for
minority shareholders, and are reportedly an impediment  today to corporate workouts.
13The weaknesses in corporate governance are confirmed by the results of a  survey of 202
firms listed on the SET in mid-1996 (Price Waterhouse, 1997).  The survey revealed that about
70% of senior management felt that  considerable improvements should be  made on  corporate
governance issues in Thailand, with the majority stating that they would prefer an approach which
involved both  the  SET  and  a  system of  self-regulation by  the  listed  companies  themselves.
Financial and institutional advisors felt that improved corporate governance practices would give
added benefits to the Thai capital markets relative to other markets in the region.
Weak Market Incentives
The incentives  to improve disclosure and governance, either at the individual firm level or
at  the country  level, were not strong  in Thailand  during the  early  1990s.  Many  firms  had
comfortable relations with banks and other financial intermediaries and were easily able to raise
equity through new stock issues. With  ample  liquidity and weak market discipline, firms  and
insiders had  little to gain  from improving disclosure and  corporate governance.  This  lack of
market discipline appears to  have been due to five factors.
*  First, and probably most important, the rapid and large increase in stock prices in the early
1990s in Thailand and throughout Asia, and the  resulting boom type mentality, may  have
reduced the sensitivity of equity investors to company disclosure and governance.
*  Second, as mentioned above, there  may have been interlocking ownership and  other inter-
relationships between financial intermediaries and  corporates, as  in Chile  during the  early
1980s.  Korea is an another example of how interrelationships between banks and corporates
can reduce market discipline.
*  Third, the relatively heavy presence of government in capital markets, at least compared to
industrial  country markets,  as  well  as  government ownership  and  contingent government
support (e.g., in large infrastructure projects) may have also comforted investors.
*  Fourth,  domestic  institutional investors,  in  particular  pension funds,  that  are  playing  an
increasing important role in corporate governance in industrial countries, are still developing in
Thailand.  For example, while the Thai mutual fund industry compares well to those in other
developing countries in the region, it is still small; in 1996, trading by mutual funds in the SET
only represented 6.8% of total trading." 2 Pension funds are perhaps even weaker in Thailand.
Until  recently,  they  have  been  constrained  by  the  lack  of  formal  institutional  pension
arrangements  as  well  as  by  restrictive  asset  allocation regulations.  Provident funds  for
government workers and workers in public enterprises have only been established recently and
are still largely restricted to government  paper and cash.
*  Fifth,  market  and  regulatory  institutions that  play  a  key  role  in  industrial  countries  in
facilitating  and  creating  incentives for  market  discipline  are  not  yet  fully  developed in
Thailand.  For example, Thailand's single credit rating agency (TRIS) was only established in
the  1990s and  is  still considered by the market to  be developing expertise.  The nascent
regulatory framework further aggravated this lack of market institutions.  A modem legislative
regulatory framework was only promulgated in 1992, at the same time that the Securities and
Exchange Commission was established.  Although by  1997, Thailand has built the legal and
regulatory basis  for modern capital markets,  this  process  has  been gradual.  During  this
12 Data  provided  by the SET.
14transition  period, capital markets did not necessarily adequately perform their signaling and
monitoring functions." 3
Protecting Minority Shareholders
The legal anu regula*  ory systems of many countries in Asia include a relatively wide set of
provisions to protect shareholders from abuse by  insiders. Table 3  compares  the investor and
creditor protection in East Asia with other regions and benchmarks from industrial countries.  The
table  shows that  shareholders  are better  protected  in  Asia than  in  Latin  America  and  legal
protection mechanisms lor creditors are also stronger in Asia than in Latin America. With regard
to judicial  enforcement (of  property rights)  however, the  region, especially Indonesia  and  the
Philippines, scores much below Latin America.  Compared to industrial countries, the differences
are even more striking.  The,e weak enforcement capacities mean shareholders can not fully use
protecting mechanisms.  Furthermore, weak disclosure means shareholders often do not have the
information to judge corporate performance and insider behavior.
In  Thailand,  like  in many  other  countries in East  Asia,  the  enforcement of minority
shareholder and creditor rights is being undermined  by a weak judicial system.  As shown in Table
3, the quality of judicial enforcement is weaker in Thailand than in Malaysia, India and in four out
of six Latin American countries included in the table.  For example, according to one of the legal
sub-indices reported by La Porta et al. (1998), the efficiency of the financial system in Thailand is
the second worse among the 49 countries in their sample. 14  The speed of foreclosing on collateral
(reportedly up two to three years for mortgages) as a result of slow court procedures and lack of
registries is  among the  critical issues that  may undermine Thailand's  Financial  Restructuring
Authorities' sale of assets of the closed finance companies.
13 One particular  aspect of concern  are disclosure  rules. Regarding  what to disclose,  while  in most developed  markets
rely on market  practice  and due diligence  obligations  to ensure disclosure  of all material information,  in developing
countries, it is prudent for the auilorities to be more proactive.  In several East Asian countries,  however,  markets
were still struggling  to define  more precisely  what this meant in practical  terms. Disclosure  systems  were also weak
in how information  was disseminated  through  public  repositories  and mandated  requirements  for  publicly  held firms.
This weakened  market incentives,  particularly  for financial  intermediaries  and for firms  issuing short-term  paper.
14 An assessment of the "efficiency  and integrity  of the legal environment  as it affects business" as reported by
Business  International  Corporation  (La Porta et al, 1998).
15Table  3: Investor  Protection  in Asia and  Latin  America
Investor  Creditor  Judicial  Investor  Creditor  Judicial
Protection  Protection  Enforce-  Protection  Protection  Enforce
(1)  (2)  ment  (3)  (1)  (2)  -ment
(1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(3)
India  2  4  6.1  Argentina  4  1  5.6
Indonesia  2  4  4.4  Brazil  4  1  6.5
Malaysia  4  4  7.7  Chile  4  2  6.8
Pakistan  5  4  4.3  Colombia  I  0  5.7
Philippines  4  0  4.1  Mexico  0  0  6.0
Sri Lanka  2  3  5.0  Venezuela  1  NA  6.2
Thailand  3  3  5.9  Average  2.2  0.8  6.1
Average  3.1  3.1  5.4
(1)  An index of how well the legal framework protects equity investors.  It will equal six when (1) shareholders  are
allowed  to  vote by  mail;  (2)  shareholders  are not  required  to deposit  share  in  advance  of  a meeting;  (3)
cumulative voting is allowed; (4) when the minimum percentage of share capital required to call a meeting  is
less than 10%; (5) an oppressed minority mechanism is in place; and (6) when legislation mandates one vote per
share for all shares (or equivalent).
(2)  An index of how  well the legal  framework protects  secured creditors.  It will equal  four when: (1) there are
minimum restrictions, e.g., creditors'  consent, for firms to file for reorganization; (2) there is no automatic  stay
on collateral; (3) debtor looses control of the finm during a reorganization; and (4)  secured creditors are given
priority during a reorganization.
(3)  An index measuring  the quality of judicial enforcement ranging from I to 10 (best) equal to the average of five
sub-indexes  measuring:  (1)  efficiency  of the  judicial  system;  (2)  rule  of  law,  (3)  corruption;  (4)  risk  of
expropriation; and (5) risk of contract repudiation.
Source:  La Porta et al. (1997 and 1998).
Accounting Standards and Practices
According to the International Financial Reporting Index constructed by the Center for
International Analysis and Research, several countries in the East Asia region, including Malaysia
and  Thailand, have made strong efforts duiing the  1990s to improve accounting and reporting
standards.'5 But while many of the accounting and auditing standards in Thailand, and  in the
region more generally, are generally consistent with those issued by the International Accounting
Standards Committee, several need further  improvement." 6 In Thailand, the standards that need to
be reinforced or created include standards for financial statement disclosures, asset classification,
marketable securities, loss recognition and debt restructuring and impairment of assets. In the long
run, the need to create an independent standard setting body that includes representation from all
stakeholders is more  important to  help  ensure  conditions relevance and  quality of  accounting
standards.
15 The Center for Intemational Analysis and Research is an investment advisor located in the United States.  The
index is based on the reporting practices of major domestic corporates with regard to 85 disclosure variables.
16  Malaysia, for instance, has adopted 24 of the 31 intemational accounting standards without alteration, while the
others are generally consistent with international standards (World Bank, 1997).
16There is strong  anecdotal  evidence  that accounting  and auditing  practices  in Thailand  are
not yet up to intemational  standards.  First, compliance  with accounting  rules, certification,  and
enforcement  of a code of ethics has been hampered  by weaknesses  in industry self-regulatory
organizations. The lack of strong self- regulatory  organizations  in the auditing and accounting
profession  is common  in many countries  in South East Asia.  In Indonesia,  for instance, in the
absence of strong professional  associations,  BAPEPAM  (the official capital market regulatory
agency) licenses  legal and accounting  professionals  to work in the securities  areas. Currently,  in
Thailand  three  official  agencies  share regulatory  authority. An additional  problem  in Thailand  has
been a shortage  of well-qualified  accountants  and auditors  together  with unnecessary  statutory  and
mandatory  requirements.  In particular,  300,000  partnerships  and inactive  limited  companies  need
to be audited every year.  The impact of this shortage of well-qualified  accountants  has been
compounded,  as in many other countries  in East Asia (e.g., Indonesia),  by restrictions on the
activities  of foreign  accounting  firms.
5.  EMPIRICAL  TESTS
In this section, we study the various relationships  between ownership concentration,
leverage,  and corporate  performance.  In particular,  we investigate  three related  hypotheses. First,
on a cross-sectional  basis, we expect  that firms with more  tightly held ownership  display  a higher
level of productivity  and profitability. We expect,  however,  that these firms may be less flexible
over time in changing  their corporate governance,  and hence may experience  a deterioration  in
financial  performance. Second,  firms with concentrated  ownership-and associated  links to the
banking  system-may have had easier access to debt financing  and may have disproportionately
increased  their leverage,  thus creating  greater exposure  to adverse  shocks. Finally, if financing
was  indeed not  made available on  an  arms-length basis,  firms with rapidly deteriorating
performance  may have  been able to finance  their losses,  rather  than being  forced  to adjust. If this
hypothesis  is true, firms with worse  profitability  may, over time, have had more rather than less
access  to extemal  finance  as compared  to firms  with better financial  performance.
Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance
High ownership  in the hands of a few holders may lead to slower  response  to changing
market  conditions.  To test this hypothesis,  we investigate  some  relationships  for the firms listed  on
the SET (see Annex 1 for a description  of the data). First, we regress 1992  profitability  on 1992
ownership  concentration.  Our  prior is that more  profitable  firms will have higher  concentration  of
ownership for two reasons: there will be  a  bias  of more profitable firms attracting more
concentrated  owners;  and there will be better monitoring  when ownership  is concentrated,  leading
to more profitable  firms. Second,  we regress 1996  profitability  on 1992  ownership  concentration.
We hypothesize  here  that the more concentrated  ownership  is, the less likely  it is that management
has made the necessary changes  in corporate behavior over the period 1992-96, leading to  a
deteriorating  profitability. The results for both regressions  are reported  in Table 4 and are also
depicted  in Figure  2.
17Table 4: Ownership  Concentration  and Profitability
PROFIT92  PROFIT96
Ownership  Concentration  1992  0.202*  -0.063
(0.084)  (-0.  090)
Sector  Dunmmies  Included  Yes  Yes
Size  Dummies  Included  Yes  Yes
Observations  236  236
R  2  0.176  0.163
Notes:  Profitability  is defined  as EBIT over  sales. Ownership
concentration  is the share  of top 5 owners.  Standard  errors in parentheses.
Ownership concentration is positively (and significantly) related to profitability in 1992.
This association, however, turns negative by 1996 (albeit not significant).  Since we have the same
sample of firms in both periods, the results suggest that firms with concentrated ownership show a
deteriorating performance relative to firms with less concentrated ownership.  This may be for a
number of reasons, as argued in the previous paragraphs, one of them being  the  aspiration of
owners to extend their business, frequently beyond efficient  levels.
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Note: The vertical  axis depicts  the level of profitability  while the horizontal  axis shows  the
concentration  of top five  owners. The left bars are for 1992  and the right bars are for 1996.
Ownership Concentration and Leverage
Another negative consequence of concentrated ownership, particularly  ownership in the
hands of families that have controlling interests in banks, is the possibility of easy borrowing and
the resulting increase in leverage.  We illustrate this possibility by regressing leverage on initial
ownership concentration for 1992 and 1996 (Table 5 and Figure 3).  The effect is present in both
years: firms with more concentrated ownership have higher leverage, even when we  adjust for
cross-sector differences.  This effect almost doubles in magnitude between 1992 and  1996. Figure
183 confirmns  this relationship  between initial ownership  concentration  and changes in leverage.
Firms where top-five owners' concentration  is 60-80% have the highest increase in leverage
between 1992  and 1996 - an average  of 53%. In contrast,  firms with dispersed  ownership  (below
40% of shares belonging  to the top five owners)  show an increase in leverage  of only 17% on
average.
Table 5: Ownership  Concentration  and  Leverage
Leverage92  Leverage96
Ownership Concentration  1992  0.151*  0.287*
(0.044)  (0.072)
Sector Dummies Included  Yes  Yes
Size Dummies Included  Yes  Yes
Observations  236  236
0.265  0.322
Notes: Leverage is defined as debt over equity.  Ownership
concentration is the share of top 5 owners. Standard errors in parentheses.
Figure  3: Ownership  Concentration  and  Changes  in Leverage
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Note: The vertical axis is the percent change in leverage 1992-96, the horizontal axis is the top-five
owners'  concentration.
By including  sector  and size dummies,  we control  both for cross-sector  variation  and for
size within-sector  variation.  The possibility  that large firms have on average (increasingly)  higher
leverage  is controlled  for by the inclusion  of size dummies  in the regressions. We constructed  the
size dummies  by ranking  all companies  in a particular  sector  by employment,  and then  constructing
dummnies  for each quartile  of firms. Thus the largest  25% of firms in a given sector  are dummied
out separately;  the second  largest  25% form  another  group, etc. The correlation  between  ownership
structure and leverage  may nevertheless  be spurious  if firms with high ownership  concentration
also display  some distinguishing  characteristics  other than cross-sector  variation  and size that are
not included  in the regressions.
19Leverage and Profitability
We then study  the contemporaneous  correlation  between  corporate  financing  patterns and
corporate performance  in Thailand. One possible contributing  factor to the financial crisis in
Thailand may be related to the non market-based  access to outside financing,  especially  from
commercial  banks. Firms which  experience  deteriorating  performance  may have been tempted  to
get involved  in projects with  possibly  high returns, but high risk. To undertake  such projects
would  have required  extra outside  financing. If the bank-corporate  links have  been  less than arms-
length,  financing  may have gone towards  riskier projects  at the expense  of firms which required
financing  for less risky  projects,  but whose  performance  was stable.
We find no apparent correlation  between  leverage  in 1993 and corporate profitability  in
1992. In contrast, higher  leverage  in 1996 is associated  with lower profitability  in the previous
year. This pattern lends  some support  to our hypothesis:  firms with relatively  worse performance
got a disproportionately  large share of financing  in the period immediately  preceding  the crisis.
This likely  exacerbated  the severity  of the crisis.
The simple  associations  demonstrated  in this section  give some credence  to the problem
areas identified  in the previous section regarding  Thailand's  corporate governance  and finance.
There are, unfortunately,  no quick fixes to these problems  as they arise endogenously  from the
structure  and incentives  of the Thai corporate  sector,  and they  may require  deep  changes  in the way
the ownership  of the real and financial  sector of Thai economy  is distributed. We do believe,
however,  that some  change  is possible  and suggest  some  specific  options  for policy actions in the
concluding  section.






Sector  Dummies  hicluded  Yes  Yes
Size Dummniies  Included  Yes  Yes
Observations  236  236
R  2  0.089  0.208
Notes:  Leverage  is defined  as debt over  equity. Profitability
is defined  as EBIT  over sales. Standard  errors in parentheses.
6.  OPTIONS  FOR  ACTION
The main lesson  from the international  experience  is that it is important  to take an integrated
approach to the issue of corporate  govemance  and corporate  financing. There are strong links
between  corporate  governance  and corporate  financing  on the one hand and the legal framework,
competition  policies,  the evolution  of the real sector,  etc. on the other hand. Consequently,  policy
recommendations  on corporate  governance  and corporate  financing  can not focus on one aspect
only. To assure,  for example,  that the objective  of lowering  the leverage  of firms is consistent  with
20the overall financial sector evolution,  one would have to  ensure that there is enough equity
available,  either in the domestic  system  as a whole, or from foreign  sources. Equally,  to ensure
that incentives  are not skewed  towards continued  lending  to the largest firms, it will often be
important  to restructure  the banking system.  Otherwise,  undercapitalized  banks may continue  to
lend  to firms which  are "too big to fail." The quality  and effectiveness  of commercial  laws will in
turn partly determiine  the extent to which all types of creditors can play a  role in corporate
governance.
Another important lesson is that improving  the framework  for corporate govemance  and
corporate  financing  takes time and requires  considerable  changes  in attitudes. Only countries  that
have  gone  through  extreme  crises have  been  able to alter the form of governance  and distribution  of
control of the real and financial  sector in a  short period of time.' 7 We do not expect that the
corporate govemance structure, and the related corporate financing structure, will change
dramatically  in Thailand  in the near-term  through  some  major "stock" changes. We rather expect
changes  on a "flow"  basis, where  the financial  pressures  under  which  many  firms currently  operate
will  be the main  driving  force  for corporate  restructuring  and changes  in corporate  govemance.
Near-terrn  policies should  aim at making  the necessary  restructuring,  de-leveraging  of firms
(through  divestiture  or sale of assets; the stream-lining  of business  units;  operational  restructuring,
etc.) and new equity  infusion  most efficient. They  should  aim at ensuring  that the least amount  of
going  concern  value and goodwill  is lost and the smallest  number  of viable,  but over-indebted  firms
are pushed  into bankruptcy. This requires  a number  of changes  in tax and regulatory  policies  to
assure  a more  smooth  enterprise  restructuring  process. In the case of Thailand,  the most important
policies  are: to expand  the role of foreigners  in the enterprise  sector,  to review  tax rules that may
discourage  debt restructuring,  debt-equity  swaps and mergers  and acquisitions,  and to review  the
bankruptcy  legislation  so as not to discourage  new  money  to firms in financial  distress. It will also
be important  to take initial steps in the governance  and disclosure  areas to assure new outside
investors of the  long-term commitment  of  the  regulatory authorities and  domestic market
participants  to the reform  process.
To improve  the structure  of corporate  financing  and the framework  for corporate  govemance,
the most urgent  task now  will be to change  incentives  such that the overall  system  allows  for better
outcomes  over  time. This will involve,  inter alia, accelerating  planned  legal reforms,  including  the
bankruptcy  and foreclosure  laws.  In addition,  six areas of specific  importance  for changing  the
corporate  govemance  and corporate  financing  are:
1.  Enhancing  Enterprise  Monitoring  The role of  commercial  banks in  enterprise
monitoring  and corporate  govemance  will  have to be enhanced  through  a comprehensive  program
of bank restructuring  and institutional  development.  Banks,  which in the short-run  will dominate
Thailand's financial  sector,  need  to become  more  effective  monitors  of firms' management,  in an
ex-ante, interim  and ex-post sense.  At the same  time, banks need  to develop  more arms-length
relationships  with firms. This will require stricter enforcement  of insider  and connected  lending
limits, violation  of which  has contributed  to the recent  financial  crisis and poor intermediation.  In
17  Chile is an example  of a country  that achieved  a significant  ownership  and control  transformation  of its economy
following  its financial  crisis of the early 1  980s.  The transformation  involved  a reduced  role for conglomerates,  the
privatization  of state enterprises,  a fally funded  pension  system,  and various  other  tools.  Many  transition  economies
have also been  able to achieve  a rapid  transformation  (see World  Bank, 1996).
21those cases where  banks and firms are effectively  controlled  by the same shareholders,  increased
transparency  is required  (which  could  take the form of increased  disclosure  or the requirement  of a
formal ownership  relationship,  such as through a holding  company). Other financial  institutions
and agents involved  in disciplining  firms  should  be encouraged  to enhance  their role. For example,
over time, bond investors  can play an important  role in disciplining  managers,  but this requires
some changes in the commercial  codes.  Foreign investors' role in corporate governance  and
corporate financing  will benefit from the removal of some impediments  in the legal framework,
including  in the Alien  Business  Law.
2.  Improving  Disclosure and Accounting Practices The disclosure of information and the
accounting  practices  in Thailand  should  be improved. While disclosure  and accounting  rules are
becoming increasingly  consistent  with international  standards, the application of these rules
appears to be hindered by the limited role of the self-regulatory  agencies (SROs) in raising
standards and practices and imposing  sanctions  on irregular behavior. A larger role for SROs,
backed  up by increased  legal powers  to discipline  violators,  may  be needed. In addition,  the market
structure of the accounting  industry,  with limited  participation  by foreigners,  may have been a
hindrance  to upgrading  practices.
3.  Better  Enforcement of  Corporate  Governance Rules The formal corporate  governance
framework  in Thailand  is not different  from the standards  used by developing  countries  at similar
income levels. But, again, the practice and enforcement  of the corporate  govemance  rules are
weak. Important  changes  in the capital  markets  as well  as in the judicial system  are needed  such
that  minority shareholders' rights are better protected in  practice.  The main lead for
improvements  will have to come from two institutions:  SET'and SEC.  Extra tools to enforce
regulations  and discipline  members  may be needed  to make these institutions  more effective. In
this context,  it may be useful to review  the process  for the appointment  of commissioners  of the
SEC and board members  of the SET.  Also, an enhanced  role of SEC and SET in monitoring
shareholders' actions is  necessary, as  insider transactions have damaged Thailand's capital
markets  reputation.
4.  Facilitating  Equity Institutions As external  financing  needs  are high, particularly  for new
equity, attracting new investors will be  important.  To facilitate the process of new equity
infusions,  it will be necessary  to provide  new investors  with a more direct role in monitoring  and
disciplining  managers.  This will require  a good minority  shareholders  representation  on the board
of directors, which in tum may imply ensuring broader application  of the one-share  one-vote
principle  and using cumulative  voting  for the appointment  of directors. It may also be useful to
introduce  supermajority  voting  rules for fundamental  corporate  decisions,  such as acquisitions  and
major investments.  Some  market participants  and analysts have even suggested  that new equity
infusions  may require a more-than-proportional  representation  on the board of directors by new
equity owners,  at least initially  until other investor  protection  mechanisms  are strengthened. And
improving corporate governance  will require enhancing  the role of institutional investors in
Thailand in firm monitoring,  which will have to start by improving  the governance  of these
investors  themselves.
5.  Improving the Corporate Governance Framework  In the more medium-term, a number of
improvements  in the corporate  governance  framework  are desirable. The proposal by SET (see
Stock Exchange  of Thailand,  1997)  for self-regulation  on corporate  governance  of listed  firms, i.e.,
to  adopt standards regarding the roles, duties and responsibilities  of the directors of  listed
22companies  to which firms can subscribe,  could be made mandatory. More generally,  Thailand
could  benefit  from a broad public  discussion  on the topic of corporate  governance,  similar  to what
happened  in the UK and other developed  countries in recent years.' 8 In the end, the issue of
corporate  governance  concerns  the distribution  of control  in the economy  over the real sector. A
discussion  of the preferred  evolution  of the real (industrial  sector) should form the basis of the
desired  evolution  of the corporate  governance  framework. The process of consultations  used for
the 1998 OECD  report on corporate  governance  provides  a good  starting  point on how this public
discussion  might  be conducted.
6.  Strengthening Institutions In terms of institutional  development,  it is clear that data
availability and  analysis of  corporate financing and corporate governance represent major
weaknesses  in Thailand. Not only is the data on corporates,  especially  on SMEs, incomplete  and
of poor quality, there are also institutional  gaps, as the responsibility  for  monitoring firm
performance  and behavior is scattered.  Follow up  work should aim at  systematizing  data
collection  on firms and performing  more and regular surveys. This should be a joint effort of
private,  semi-public  and public  organizations.
18 For example, the Cadbury (1992) and Hamel (1998, UK) report, the Toronto Stock Exchange  (Canada, 1994)
report, the Peters report (Netherlands, 1997),  the Corporate  Governance  Forum (Japan, 1997), the Statement on
Corporate  Governance  (US, 1997),  and similar  efforts  in a number  of other  countries.
23ANNEx 1: DATA  FROM  THE  STOCK  EXCHANGE  OF THAILAND
The data on which the regressions  made in this paper are based are provided  by the SET and
include balance sheet and  income statement data, major shareholders,  prices  and market
capitalization  for all listed  companies. The balance  sheet  and income  statement  data are available
on a yearly  basis, from 1992  through 1996. The companies  issue different  type of securities,  and
the shareholder information  is  available for these securities. For some securities, there is
information  across multiple  years, but often  the information  is available  for one year only.  The
earliest  shareholder  information  available  is for 1995,  the latest is for 1997. Price data is available
from 1975  through 1997. The financial  statement  and shareholder  data include  firm identification
numbers. The financial data also include  firm names, and the shareholder  data include security
names. The  price data only includes  security  names,  no firm identification  numbers  or firm names.
The  only security  types retained  in the final  data set are those of common  stock since  these
are the only securities  that match across the price and shareholder  data.  Financial  data with firm
identification  numbers that matched the identification  numbers of the firms included in the
shareholder  data set are selected  based on the statements'  classification.  Those  firms with financial
statements  classified as consolidated  and either audited or reviewed,  with preference  given to
audited  information,  were included  in the final data set. Since  shareholder  information  was sparse,
the earliest  available  time series point  was used  to fill in time series  gaps prior to data availability,
and the latest available time series point was used to fill in gaps which occurred after data
availability. This was done on the assumption  that major shareholders  did not change  very much
over this small time span.  Based on the firm identification  numbers,  the SET sector  codes were
assigned  to each firm. These sector  codes  were grouped such  that the final sector  codes assigned
were  more  coarsely  defined  than those  of the SET were.
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